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 NOTES 
Dispute Resolution Tools in Patent 
Infringement Cases 




While arbitration has become a widely accepted alternative to litigation, the 
role it should play in patent disputes has been widely debated.  Issued by the federal 
government, patents confer a temporary monopoly on the production, use, and sale 
of new innovations.  The government may have an interest in keeping such disputes 
out of the private realm of arbitration, at least when the dispute is over the validity 
of the patent.  For other patent issues such as licensing, which is essentially a private 
contract, arbitration may serve as a useful and cost-effective alternative.  Even when 
arbitration is not warranted, other useful strategies such as bifurcation of issues can 
make the dispute resolution process more efficient.  Aoki v. Gilbert, a case coming 
out of the Eastern District of California, however, is a prime example of how those 
strategies can backfire when not executed properly.  After laying out the factual and 
legal background of the case, this note will examine the effectiveness of bifurcation 
and arbitration as dispute resolution tools in patent disputes.  This note concludes 
that while bifurcation and arbitration may not have been appropriate in this case, 
they nevertheless can be an effective option in most patent licensing disputes. 
II. FACTS AND HOLDING 
For twenty-seven years, Gregory Gilbert worked as an attorney and the Chief 
Executive Officer of a medical research company in California.1  Then, his two 
year-old daughter was diagnosed with Type I diabetes.2  Gilbert focused his com-
pany’s attention on diabetes research, eventually developing an innovative new in-
sulin pump for patients like his daughter.3  As he continued delving into the field of 
diabetes research, Gilbert came into contact with Dr. Thomas Aoki, a specialist in 
the study of diabetes and the human metabolism, and the two formed a partnership.4  
In 1986, with Gilbert acting as personal counsel, Dr. Aoki founded Aoki Diabetes 
Research Institute (ADRI), a non-profit research company, and AMSys, a for-profit 
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1.Aoki v. Gilbert, No. 2:11-CV02787-TLN-CND, 2015 WL 5734626, at *3 (E.D. Cal. 2015). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. at *2. 
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company to raise funds for additional research.5  Gilbert served as a director, officer, 
and chief counsel for both companies, as well as CEO of AMSys.6 
This professional relationship bore fruit when Dr. Aoki was granted a patent in 
1989 on an intravenous insulin therapy regime called metabolic activation therapy, 
or “MAT.”7  In addition to diabetes, MAT has shown to be effective in treating 
patients with heart and cardiovascular disease, kidney disease, and optic nerve dis-
eases.8  MAT was administered by doctors affiliated with ADRI, which held an 
exclusive license to use Dr. Aoki’s patent on the treatment.9  The professional rela-
tionship came to an end in the early 2000s, and Gilbert went on to become President 
and CEO of another research company, Bionica, Inc.10 
In 2007, Dr. Aoki and ADRI discovered that Gilbert, Bionica, and a number of 
other medical facilities were treating patients with the MAT process.11  The original 
patent license authorizing ADRI became the center of attention.  Gilbert claimed 
that the license agreement extended to AMSys as well as ADRI, and that AMSys 
had conveyed its license rights to two other companies in a settlement agreement.12  
Gilbert in turn personally received that license right when those companies con-
veyed it to him.13  At the same time, Bionica claimed that a 1992 amendment to the 
original agreement granted a non-exclusive, royalty-free license to Connecticut In-
novations Incorporated (CII), and that in 2005 Bionica purchased that license from 
CII.14  Gilbert and Bionica then sublicensed the MAT treatment to several other 
medical facilities.15 
Dr. Aoki sued Gilbert, Bionica, and the other medical facilities using MAT, 
arguing that ADRI is the only entity authorized to use the MAT technology.16  After 
several years of pretrial motions, the defendants in the case moved to bifurcate the 
proceedings and to compel arbitration under the terms of the original patent license 
agreement.17  Judge Nunley of the District Court for the Eastern District of Califor-
nia denied both motions.18  In doing so, Judge Nunley held that the Defendants had 
failed to provide any evidence that bifurcation would promote judicial economy and 
efficiency.19  Furthermore, arbitration could not be compelled because a genuine 
issue of fact existed as to whether the Defendants were parties to valid arbitration 
agreements.20  Additionally, the motion to compel was raised three years after the 
start of litigation, so that granting it would result in a delay in proceedings so un-
reasonable as to prejudice the Plaintiffs’ case.21 
                                                          
 5. Id. at *3. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Aoki, 2015 WL 5734626, at *2. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. at *3. 
 11. Id. at *4. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Aoki, 2015 WL 5734626, at *4. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. at *1. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Aoki, 2015 WL 5734626, at *5-6. 
 20. Id. at *8. 
 21. Id. at* 6, *9. 
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III. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
This case presents two distinct legal issues, each with their own backgrounds: 
bifurcation, and compelling arbitration.  For simplicity and clarity, these two issues 
will be examined separately. 
A. Bifurcation 
The modern process of bifurcating, or separating, trials has its roots in the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure.22  Specifically, Rule 42(b) states that “[f]or conven-
ience, to avoid prejudice, or to expedite and economize, the court may order a sep-
arate trial of one or more separate issues, claims, crossclaims, counterclaims, or 
third-party claims.”23  As the rule’s text states, the primary purpose of allowing 
separate trials is to promote efficiency in the court system.24  Efficiency, however, 
can connote a number of different things.  The Ninth Circuit has held that “[o]ne of 
the purposes of Rule 42(b) is to permit deferral of costly and possibly unnecessary 
discovery proceedings pending resolution of potentially dispositive preliminary is-
sues.”25  In Ellingson Timber Co. v. Great Northern Ry. Co., the Ninth Circuit up-
held a trial court’s decision to bifurcate a case into two discrete issues and to limit 
discovery to only facts directly involving those two issues.26  In so holding, the 
Ninth Circuit concluded that “[i]t is implicit that the court also had power to limit 
discovery to the segregated issues,” despite no such language being found in the 
rule itself.27 
Limiting discovery costs is not the only way courts have sought to use Rule 
42(b) to increase efficiency.  Saving time at trial by reducing the issues parties must 
prove has also been a favored tactic of trial courts.28  In a complex antitrust case, 
the District Court for the Southern District of New York allowed a separate trial to 
determine whether a purchaser-distributor relationship existed between the par-
ties.29  This was the threshold element required for the plaintiffs to prove their anti-
trust claim.30  The court reasoned if the parties were required to put on proof of this 
element along with the remaining elements of price discrimination, competition, 
and damages, the parties would be forced to offer cumulative and confusing evi-
dence on a complex topic to the jury.31  The reasoned that bifurcation was appro-
priate “[b]ecause of the possibility of simplifying fact presentation, reducing costs, 
[and] saving trial time….”32 
In the context of patent law cases, bifurcation has been a useful tool when it is 
questionable whether the patent at issue is valid.  Because one of the elements the 
plaintiff must prove in a patent infringement case is that the patent itself is valid,33 
                                                          
 22. See FED. R. CIV. P. 42(b). 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Ellingson Timber Co. v. Great N. Ry. Co. 424 F.2d. 497, 499 (9th Cir. 1970). 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. See Reines Distributors, Inc. v. Admiral Corp., 257 F.Supp. 619, 620 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). 
 29. Id. at 622. 
 30. Id. at 620. 
 31. Id. at 621. 
 32. Id.at 622. 
 33. Graver Tank &Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950). 
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complicated disputes can arise over validity even before the defendant’s actions 
ever become relevant.  In Woburn Degreasing Co. of New Jersey v. Spencer Kellogg 
& Sons, the court ordered bifurcation to determine the issue of validity before con-
sidering the defendant’s other claims and defenses.34  Since determining whether 
the patent in that case was valid would require substantial examination of the prior 
art (i.e. other similar inventions already on the market), requiring the whole case to 
go to trial would effectively create a mini-trial on just one element before any of the 
other substantive matters could even be evaluated.35  Specifically, the court was 
concerned that “…expert testimony will be required to prove or disprove the equiv-
alency of chemical terms and an interpretation of the applications and patents in 
other respects.”36 
Though Rule 42(b)’s text appears to give courts wide discretion on when bi-
furcation is appropriate,37 several cases have attempted to craft guidelines on when 
that discretion should be exercised.  With only slight variations in wording, federal 
courts have consistently expounded three factors to consider: “1) whether signifi-
cant resources would be saved by bifurcation, 2) whether bifurcation will increase 
juror comprehension, and 3) whether bifurcation will lead to repeat presentations of 
the same evidence and witnesses.”38  Additionally, many courts will also consider 
whether the issues under consideration are clearly separable.39  Finally, courts agree 
that “[t]he party seeking bifurcation has the burden of demonstrating that judicial 
economy would be promoted and that no party would be prejudiced by separate 
trials.”40  Despite these factors, courts retain broad latitude in making the decision 
to bifurcate that can only be overturned for abuse of discretion.41 
B. Compelling Arbitration 
While arbitration has existed in some form in the English common law system 
for centuries,42 the modern American arbitration regime traces its origin to the Fed-
eral Arbitration Act of 1925 (FAA).43  Responding to the hostility toward arbitration 
felt in the legal community, the act declared that any contractual agreement to arbi-
trate would be “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist 
at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”44  The Supreme Court has 
consistently held that by enacting the FAA, Congress created a “liberal federal pol-
icy favoring arbitration agreements,…[t]he effect of the section is to create a body 
                                                          
 34. Woburn Degreasing Co. of New Jersey v. Spencer Kellogg & Sons, 37 F. Supp. 311, 314 
(W.D.N.Y. 1941). 
 35. Id. at 313. 
 36. Id. 
 37. FED. R. CIV. P. 42(b) ([T]he court may order a separate trial”)(emphasis added). 
 38. Gaus v. Conair Corp., No. 94 CIV. 5693 KTD, 2000 WL 1277365, at *3 (S.D.N.Y 2000). 
 39. Aoki v. Gilbert, No. 2:11-CV02787-TLN-CND, 2015 WL 5734626, at *4 (E.D. Cal. 2015). 
 40. Princeton Biochemicals Inc. v. Beckman Instruments Inc., 180 F.R.D. 254, 256 (D.N.J. 1997). 
 41. Hirst v. Gertzen, 676 F.2d 1252, 1261 (9th Cir. 1982) (“This bifurcation was within the sound 
discretion of the district court. We must uphold the court’s decision absent an abuse of discretion”). 
 42. See generally Carli N. Conklin, A Variety of State-Level Procedures, Practices, and Policies: Ar-
bitration in Early America, 2016 J. DISP. RESOL. 55 (2016)(discussing history of arbitration in the early 
United States); see also Francis Calvert Boorman, Arbitration and Elite Honour in Elizabethan England: 
A Case Study of Bess of Hardwick, 2016 J. DISP. RESOL. 19 (2016)(discussing history of arbitration in 
early modern England). 
 43. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011). 
 44. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
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of federal substantive law of arbitrability, applicable to any arbitration agreement 
within the coverage of the Act.”45 
Despite this general mandate that arbitration agreements should be enforced, 
some situations are recognized as creating an exception to this rule.  Section 3 of 
the FAA requires a court “upon being satisfied that the issue involved in such suit 
or proceeding is preferable to arbitration…shall…stay the trial of the action until 
such arbitration has been had….”46  This section provides limited grounds on which 
arbitration can be denied.  Since arbitration agreements are generally contractual 
provisions, courts turn to contract law to determine whether such agreements are 
valid.  For example, “[u]nder California law, courts may refuse to enforce any con-
tract found ‘to have been unconscionable at the time it was made,’ or may ‘limit the 
application of any unconscionable clause.’”47 
In evaluating unconscionability, California courts look to both the substance of 
the agreement and the procedures used to implement the agreement.48  In the arbi-
tration context, substantive unconscionability can be deemed to arise from a number 
of different provisions, including lack of mutuality in compelling arbitration, lim-
ited discovery, limited judicial review, or limited procedural protections.49  Proce-
dural unconscionability can also come about in several ways, but the most common 
method is an imbalance in bargaining power between the parties.50 
Another contract principle courts use to evaluate the enforceability of arbitra-
tion agreements is the concept of waiver.51  However, showing that one party has 
waived a contractual right to arbitrate is a heavy burden.52  This is because the Su-
preme Court in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co. held that arbitration agreements are 
analogous to forum-selection clauses and should be enforced “absent a strong show-
ing that it should be set aside.”53  In an increasingly global economy, agreements 
about where and in what type of tribunal disputes are to be resolved become even 
more important to parties entering into contracts.54  The Court reasoned that it would 
be “it would be unrealistic to think that the parties did not conduct their negotiations, 
including fixing the monetary terms, with the consequences of the forum clause 
figuring prominently in their calculations.”55 
With this commercial justification in mind, courts have required three elements 
be proven before allowing a party to waive an arbitration right: “(1) knowledge of 
an existing right to compel arbitration; (2) acts inconsistent with that existing right; 
and (3) prejudice to the party opposing arbitration resulting from such inconsistent 
                                                          
 45. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 US 1, 24 (1982). 
 46. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (2012). 
 47. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 340. 
 48. See Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 690 (Cal. 2000) (“[U]ncon-
scionability has both a ‘procedural’ and a ‘substantive’ element”). 
 49. Id. at 691. 
 50. Id. at 690. 
 51. Aoki v. Gilbert, No. 2:11-CV02787-TLN-CND, 2015 WL 5734626, at *8 (E.D. Cal. 2015). 
 52. See United States v. Park Place Assocs., Ltd., 563 F.3d 907, 921 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[A]ny party 
arguing waiver of arbitration bears a heavy burden of proof.”). 
 53. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 518 (1974)(quoting Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 
407 U.S. 1, 15 (1972)). 
 54. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 518. 
 55. Smith-Johnson Motor Corp. v. Hoffman Motors Corp., 411 F. Supp. 670, 676 (E.D. Va. 1975). 
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acts.”56  Delaying filing a motion to compel arbitration absent extenuating circum-
stances has consistently been held to satisfy the inconsistent acts prong of this test.57  
Prejudice is assessed by whether the parties would have to incur significant costs in 
both time and money in preparing for arbitration.58 
IV. INSTANT DECISION 
The District Court assessed the bifurcation and arbitration arguments sepa-
rately for clarity and simplicity.  The same will be done here. 
A. Bifurcation 
The court begins its analysis be reiterating that Gilbert and his associated de-
fendants bear the burden of proving that bifurcation is desirable in this case.59  The 
court then proceeded to reject defendants’ motion for four reasons. 
First, the court found that defendants have failed to provide more than a con-
clusory statement that bifurcation would promote judicial economy.60  Defendants 
did not specify which issues should be separated, let alone provide a reason for why 
some issues should be separated.61  Instead, defendants claimed that “that arbitration 
would be ‘obviously’ more convenient than trial, because ‘such is the purpose of 
arbitration.’”62  The court notes that such a statement confuses separating issues into 
multiple trials with compelling arbitration: only the former is an effect of bifurca-
tion.63 
Next, the court examined whether bifurcation would result in prejudice to either 
party.64  Again, defendants offered no more than a conclusory statement that “there 
is no prejudice against the plaintiffs at issue here.”65  The court, however, disagreed.  
The court found that plaintiffs had been prejudiced because “[p]rejudice ... may 
simply amount to unfair delay of the final disposition of the matter.”66  The court 
reasoned that a three year delay in filing the motion for bifurcation, especially after 
several judgments on dispositive motions, amounted to unfair prejudice against the 
plaintiffs.67 
Third, the court held that defendants had failed to explain how and why bifur-
cation would decrease the possibility of jury confusion.68  As with the judicial econ-
omy argument, defendants failed to specify any particular issues they thought would 
                                                          
 56. Fisher v. A.G. Becker Paribas Inc., 791 F.2d 691, 694 (9th Cir. 1986). 
 57. See id. at 694-7. (holding that declining to move to compel arbitration out of a good faith belief 
that such a motion was legally futile is not an inconsistent act, and thus an exception to the general rule). 
 58. Id. 
 59. Aoki v. Gilbert, No. 2:11-CV02787-TLN-CND, 2015 WL 5734626, at *5 (E.D. Cal. 2015). 
 60. Id. at *6. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Aoki, 2015 WL 5734626, at *6. 
 66. Id. (quoting Willemijn HoudstermaatschaapijBV v. Apollo Computer Inc., 707 F. Supp. 1429, 
1435 (D. Del 1989)). 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
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likely be confusing.69  Additionally, the court noted that as a matter of judicial pol-
icy, “[i]n patent cases, as in others, separate trials should be the exception, not the 
rule.”70 
Finally, the court looked to whether the issues in the case were easily separable.  
Once again, the court noted that the defendants offered no more than a conclusory 
statement supporting their position.71  Though defendants attempted to argue that 
bifurcation was warranted because some issues were matters of statutory interpre-
tation and others were derived from the common law, the court disagreed.72  The 
court held that when such issues were so factually and legally interwoven that they 
could not be presented to the jury separately without risking confusion and uncer-
tainty.73  In addition, the court found that there was no way to tell how much the 
issues would overlap if separated, such that the same proof would be required at 
multiple trials.74  In the court’s judgment, all four of these factors weighed against 
defendants; the motion to bifurcate was therefore denied.75 
B. Compelling Arbitration 
The court held that the defendants could not compel arbitration for two reasons: 
a previous motion to compel had already been denied, and the defendants had 
waived their right to arbitration by delaying filing the motion.76 
i. Previous Denied Motion 
First, the court reiterated the decision of Judge Morrison England in one of 
defendants’ previous motions, made in 2013,  to deny arbitration.77  In 2013, some 
of the defendants (referred to by the court as “the Hayward Defendants”), sought to 
enforce the 1987 Agreement’s arbitration clause as successors in interest to the orig-
inal parties to the agreement.78  Judge England found that there was a genuine issue 
of material fact over whether the Hayward Defendants actually were successors in 
interest, and that the motion should therefore be denied.79 
The court applied the same reasoning as Judge England in reaching its decision, 
as the 2015 motion rested on “identical grounds.”80  Like the Hayward Defendants, 
the defendants raising the current motion were not signatories of the original 1987 
Agreement.81  They therefore bear the burden of proving “[they are] a party to the 
arbitration agreement/provision covering the dispute.”82 
                                                          
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. (quoting Laitram Corp. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 791 F. Supp. 113, 114 (E.D. La. 1992)). 
 71. Aoki, 2015 WL 5734626, at *6. 
 72. Id. 
 73. United Air Lines, Inc. v. Wiener, 286 F.2d 302, 305 (9th Cir. 1961). 
 74. Aoki, 2015 WL 5734626, at *6. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at *7. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. (“Only when there is no genuine issue of material fact concerning the formation of an agree-
ment should a court decide as a matter of law that the parties in the litigation are also parties to the 
agreement.”). 
 80. Aoki, 2015 WL 5734626, at *7. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. (quoting Jones v. Jacobson, 125 Cal.App. 3d 522, 534 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011)). 
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The defendants argued that Gilbert and Bionica received their sublicenses for 
the patent through separate transactions in 2001 and 2005, respectively.83  All other 
defendants’ sublicenses derive from one of those two transactions.84  Their validity 
thus depends on the validity of the 2001 and 2005 sublicenses.  However, as in the 
motion to bifurcate, defendants failed to provide a reason for why the current mo-
tion should be treated as any different from the motion before Judge England.85  The 
original motion contained no more than a conclusory statement that Gilbert’s sub-
license is valid.86  Judge England previously held that this alone could not show that 
there was no genuine issue of material fact about validity; the court here did the 
same.87 
ii. Waiver 
The court applied the three-part test described above in reaching the determi-
nation that defendants had waived their right to arbitration.88  This test requires a 
showing of knowledge of an arbitration agreement, acts inconsistent with that 
agreement, and prejudice to the party opposing arbitration.89  The first element of 
knowledge was the clearly established: all the defendants had at least constructive 
notice of the arbitration clause from the time the first motion to compel arbitration 
was filed before Judge England.90 
In satisfaction of the second element of inconsistent acts, the court pointed to 
the multitude of motions filed by defendants.91  Among these motions were the pre-
vious motion to compel arbitration and two motions for summary judgment.92  
These motions are dispositive—granting any one of them would bring the case to a 
close.  Just as important is the fact that the summary judgment motions both dealt 
“specifically on the licensing rights arising from the 1987 Agreement—the same 
licensing rights that they now argue should be the subject of compelled arbitra-
tion.”93  By seeking summary judgment before compelling arbitration, the court 
reasoned, defendants chose to settle their dispute through the judicial system rather 
than through private arbitration.94  The 2015 motion therefore is no more than an 
attempt to find a more favorable outcome in a different forum.95 
Finally, in assessing prejudice the court held that defendants’ three year delay 
in bringing the motion was “egregious.”96  The court held that this delay heaped 
costs on plaintiffs, as they had to respond to all motions filed in the intervening 
                                                          
 83. Aoki, 2015 WL 5734626, at *7. 
 84. Id. at *8. 
 85. Id. at *7. 
 86. Id. (“The only evidence before the Court regarding the Hayward Clinic Defendants’ status as sub-
licensees is Gilbert’s declaration.”). 
 87. Id. at *8. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Aoki, 2015 WL 5734626, at *8 (quoting United States v. Park Place Assoc., Ltd., 563 F.3d 907, 
921 (9th Cir. 2009)). 
 90. Aoki, 2015 WL 5734626, at *8. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Aoki, 2015 WL 5734626, at *8. 
 96. Id. at *9. 
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time.97  Additionally, the delay undermined one of the principal advantages of arbi-
tration—that of “speedy and relatively inexpensive dispute resolution.”98  For these 
reasons, the court held that defendants were not entitled to arbitration. 
V. COMMENT 
In many ways, this case is very conventional: it is a dispute about a licensing 
agreement, a simple contract case.  The outcome of the case and the court’s reason-
ing in reaching that outcome reinforce this view.  The subject matter of the contract 
at issue, however, is a patent, a temporary, government-approved monopoly on the 
use of a scientific process.  The significance of this type of property interest could 
arguably have justified a less-contract friendly analysis.  The court, however, de-
cided the case exactly as it should have, though if defendants had provided adequate 
arguments, particularly on the bifurcation motion, a different outcome may have 
been warranted. 
A. Bifurcation 
The defendants’ failure to provide adequate arguments in support of their mo-
tion to bifurcate is especially unfortunate because it was the motion most likely to 
succeed.  Courts have noted that patent cases are “often uniquely amenable to bi-
furcation because of the complex nature of the damages determination and the ex-
tensive discovery that is often necessary to prove the nature and extent of those 
damages.”99 
In this case, defendants would have had a strong argument for bifurcating the 
trial into liability and damages trials.  In the liability phase, plaintiffs would have to 
prove the traditional elements of patent infringement.  First, plaintiffs would need 
to prove that they held a valid patent.  Next, plaintiffs would have to show that 
defendants’ method of treating diabetes either literally copied every element of 
plaintiffs’ patent, or else was infringing under the doctrine of equivalents.100  Since 
defendants were using the MAT process in exactly the same way as plaintiffs, plain-
tiffs should be able to make out a prima facie case of literal infringement. 
The real crux of the trial would be defendants’ claim that they hold a valid 
license to use the patented MAT process.  Evidence about the relationships between 
individual defendants and plaintiffs (including those between individual defendants 
and other individual defendants) would need to be presented to show which parties 
used the process, which parties were actually licensed to use the process, and which 
parties granted those licenses. 
A separate trial to calculate damages would only be necessary if defendants 
were found to lack valid licenses to use the MAT process.  At the most basic level, 
this requires answering the question: had the infringement never happened, how 
                                                          
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 99. Novopharm Ltd. v. Torpharm, Inc., 181 F.R.D. 308, 310 (E.D.N.C. 2007). 
 100. See Graver Tank &Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950) (holding that 
infringement occurs when “two devices do the same work in substantially the same way, and accomplish 
substantially the same result”)(internal quotation marks omitted). 
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much money would plaintiff had made from the invention?101  Answering this ques-
tion frequently requires reference to reasonable royalty rates, market values, and 
lost profits.102  It also requires attributing to each infringing defendant their share of 
the damages.  This is made substantially easier if the jury does not have to decide 
which defendants are infringers in addition to how much money they should pay.  
This case ultimately involves two complicated issues: the validity of defendants’ 
licenses, and what damages, if any, arise from their invalidity.  Having separate 
trials for each of these two issues can cut down on juror confusion, since each jury 
will only have to address one of those issues. 
B. Appropriateness of Arbitration in Patent Cases 
There has been much scholarly debate on whether patent disputes are proper 
subject matter for arbitration.103  Critics of patent arbitration have sometimes argued 
that since the federal government issues patents, any dispute about the patent’s va-
lidity must somehow include the government.104  However, as other commentators 
have pointed out, many countries’ patent laws allow fairly broad discretion in patent 
ownership once the patent has issued.105  The United States, for example, confers a 
freely assignable personal property right to holders of issued patents.106  Such a 
provision grants wide latitude to the private holder to dispose of the patent as he or 
she chooses.  It also signals that the government is relinquishing any interest it has 
in the patent process that may have justified keeping any dispute that may arise out 
of the private arena of arbitration.107  If the government ever had an interest in sub-
sequent infringement suits, it effectively waived that interest by statute. 
The sovereign power argument is particularly unpersuasive in this case.  At 
issue is not the validity of the patent, but the validity of a license to use the patent.  
Even in many jurisdictions that do not allow patent validity to be arbitrated, such 
licensing agreements are still seen as proper subject matter to arbitrate.108  Allowing 
arbitration makes sense under the regime created by 35 U.S.C. § 261 in the United 
States.  The statute allows a patent holder to transfer his or her interest in the patent 
to anyone as long as certain procedural requirements (e.g. a written instrument, 
timely recording) are met.109  Any transfer of the patent is a private transaction.  It 
should therefore be arbitrable just like any other private transaction.  Indeed, to hold 
otherwise would be to call into question the legitimacy of arbitration in general.110  
                                                          
 101. Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 507 (1964). 
 102. See generally Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2009)(discuss-
ing damages calculations). 
 103. See generally M.A. Smith et al., Arbitration of Patent Infringement and Validity Issues Worldwide, 
19 Harv. J.L. & TECH. 299, 305-314 (2006) (setting out general legal and policy arguments for and 
against arbitrating patent disputes). 
 104. Id. at 306. (“A second and more abstract legal argument against the objective arbitrability of patent 
validity concerns the sovereign nature of the patent grant: if a sovereign grants a right, only the same 
sovereign can extinguish that right”). 
 105. Id. 
 106. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2012). 
 107. Smith et al., supra note 103at 307. 
 108. Id. at 308 (“Countries making such a choice usually enforce arbitral awards concerned with the 
patent as property -- patent licensing or patent infringement -- but will not enforce awards related to the 
validity of a patent”). 
 109. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2012). 
 110. Smith et al., supra note 103 at 307. 
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If this type of transaction is not fit for arbitration purely because of its subject mat-
ter, then one would have to provide separate justifications for the arbitrability of 
other types of transactions.  No compelling justification comes to mind. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This case is simple.  Defendants’ failed to make any substantial arguments in 
support of their motions to bifurcate and compel arbitration, so the court had little 
choice but to deny them.  If they had, however, the court may have been faced with 
difficult questions about how patent litigation should fit into the alternative dispute 
resolution scheme.  Though federal statute and case law has made arbitration an 
available avenue for many patent disputes, some questions remain as to the extent 
courts are prepared to allow bifurcation.  Given the factual complexity that is often 
inherent in patent disputes, bifurcation should be seen as a useful tool, but must be 
properly invoked for parties to avail themselves of its benefits. 
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